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COMMENTS

CRIMINAL LAw AND PROCEDURE - APPEAL BY STATE - CoNSTITUTIONALITY oF STATUTES- DuE PRocEss OF LAw-Developing
as a result of a period when an accused person was placed at a tremendous disadvantage at the hands of tyrannical judges exercising
an unconscionable abuse of power, the concept that no person shall "be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"
was put into the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and
into many of the state constitutions. As a part of this double jeopardy
concept, the American courts, from the first, established the rule that
the state should not be allowed to appeal in a criminal prosecution.
The accused, rather than being imposed upon, was granted many other
aids and safeguards. But in recent years there has been a reaction
against the idea that the punishment of crime is a sort of invasion of
natural right, and, a realization that, as Holmes put it,1 "at the present time in this country there is more danger that criminals will escape
justice than that they will be subjected to tyranny."
Various states have, by statutes ingrafting exceptions, attempted
to relax the strict rule against state appeals in criminal cases. The
statutes have been attacked either by claim of protection under state
constitutions, or under guarantees in the Federal Constitution.
I.

At common law neither the state nor the defendant is allowed an
appeal in a criminal case; 2 hence, to have any appeal there must be a
statute specifically authorizing it. 8 The statutes and decisions of the
various states cover a wide range. In Connecticut, by statute, the state

1 Dissenting opinion in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 at 134, 24 S. Ct.
797 (1904).
2 I B1sHoP, CRIMINAL LAW, 9th ed., 757 (1923); BRENNAN, "The Right of the
State to Appellate Review in Criminal Cases," l OHIO ST. UNiv. L. J. 93 at 94
(1935); 38 D1cK. L. REv. 129 (1934); 92 A. L. R. n37 (1934); 17 C. J. 41
(1919).
8 State v. Felch, 92 Vt. 477, 105 A. 23 (1918), noted 28 YALE L. J. 408
(1919); State v. B'Gos, 175 Ga. 627, 165 S. E. 566 (1932), noted in 81 UNIV. PA.
L. REV. 340 (1933); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 12 S. Ct. 609 (1891).
In State v. Muolo, II8 Conn. 373, 172 A. 875 (1934), the court seems to have
allowed the state to appeal in a situation not specifically covered by statute. Noted in
4 FoRD. L. REV. 130 (1935).
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is permitted to take appeals upon all questions of law arising on the
trial of a criminal case in the same manner and to the same e:ffect as if
taken by the accused; 4 and it is held that the state, even after acquittal,
is authorized to appeal and, in case of reversal, to bring the defendant
again into court for a new trial. 5 In Illinois,6 Massachusetts,7 Minnesota,8 and Texas,9 the state cannot appeal under any conditions or
circumstances. Between these two extremes is a large variety of situations wherein the state has been authorized to appeal. The most common of these are cases where the appeal is based upon order setting
aside or quashing an indictment or information, or on an order sustaining a demurrer to an indictment or information, or an order arresting judgment, or an order granting a new trial. 10
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930), § 6494.
State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 A. IJO (1894).
6 Ill Rev. Stat. (1931), c. 38, § 747; People v. John York Co., So Ill. App.
162 at 163 (1898). The statute was modified, however, by a 1933 amendment,
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937), c. 38, § 747, which allowed the state to appeal from an order
or judgment setting aside or quashing an indictment.
1 Commonwealth v. Cummings, 3 Cush. (57 Mass.) 212 (1849).
8 State v. McGrorty, 2 Minn. 224 (1858); State v. Johnson, 146 Minn. 468,
147 N. W. 657 (1920); State v. Wellman, 143 Minn. 488, 173 N. W. 574 (1919).
9 Prescott v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 35, 105 S. W. 192 (1907).
10 According to a comment in ION. Y. UN1v. L. Q. REv. 373 at 376 (1933)
statutes in twenty-one states allow appeals by the state in one or all of these situations.
For further analysis of the statutes and decisions wherein the state has been permitted
to appeal, see Miller, "Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases," 36 YALE L. J. 486
(1927); 38 DICK. L. REV. 129 (1934); 27 J. CRIM. L. 917 (1937); 17 C. J. 41
ff. (1919); AM. L. INST., ConE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (proposed final draft),
§ 445 and commentary p. 494 (1_930).
The courts have often been very strict in their interpretation of these statutes.
In a recent case, People v. Reed, 276 N. Y. 5, II N. E. (2d) 330 (1937), the
defendants were indicted under an act making certain types of gambling a crime
except when another penalty is prescribed by law. Defendants immediately moved to
dismiss. The trial court dismissed the indictment on an erroneous ruling that another
penalty was provided by law. The state appealed from this ruling. The appeal was
dismissed by the Appellate Division, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
latter court said that if the case had gone to trial and the defendants had, by writing,
filed in the court a demurrer to the indictment, there could be a valid appeal by the
state to the judge's ruling, but even though the ruling on the motion to dismiss was for
all purposes the same, although not in writing, the statute did not permit an appeal
by the state in this situation and to do so would be to place the defendant in double
jeopardy. A part of the statute which stated that in all cases where an appeal to an
appellate court may be taken by the defendant, except where a verdict or judgment
of not guilty has been rendered, an appeal may be had by the people, was interpreted
as being meaningless since the only time the defendant was said to have an appeal
is after a verdict or judgment. It would seem that the legislature would not have done
a futile thing, and, as the district attorney suggested, may have intended to give the
people the right to appeal from any ruling dismissing the indictment or ending the
case, which did not result from a verdict of acquittal.
4
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In the few states that have no constitutional provision regarding
double jeopardy,11 there is no valid objection, under state law, to
statutes giving the state a right of appeal. Where such a constitutional
provision is present, the dispute is as to just what the double jeopardy
provision forbids. One of the chief issues on which the courts divide
is whether the constitutional provision forbids only a trial in a new
and independent cause, or also forbids a new trial in the same cause.
The great majority of the cases take the latter view.12 In most of the
instances enumerated above and in others where the state has been
allowed to appeal, it is on the theory that a second, or even a first,
jeopardy has not arisen since the question of double jeopardy is usually
said to arise only when the state is permitted an appeal after an acquittal.18 There is, however, disagreement as to what amounts to an
acquittal.14 The real difficulty is in the construction of the meaning
of double jeopardy in these state constitutions. Applying orthodox
rules of construction, what constitutes "jeopardy" would be determined
by practice and the common law at the time the constitution was
adopted. 15 But since state appeals were probably unknown when most
of the state constitutions came into being, the framers most likely were
not concerned with this branch of double jeopardy. A conjecture as to
what the framers would have intended had they thought of it leads,
naturally, to a determination of what today would be the most de11 At least five states, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and
Vermont, have no double jeopardy clauses in their constitutions. See, State v. Palko,
122 Conn. 529, 191 A. 320 (1937); Commonwealth v. Perrow, 124 Va. 805, 97
S. E. 820 (1919); Livingstone, "Twice in Jeopardy," 6 GREEN BAG 373 (1894);
27 J. CRIM. L. 917 at 919 (1937).
12 Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. (85 U.S.) 163, 21 L. Ed. 872 (1873); Kepner
v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 24 S. Ct. 797 (1904); Commonwealth v. Simpson,
310 Pa. 380, 165 A. 498 (1933); State v. Taylor, 180 Ark. 588, 22 S. W. (2d)
34 (1929). The contrary argument was expressed in Holmes' dissent to Kepner v.
United States, supra, and in State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 A. IIlO (1894).
18 Murray v. State, 210 Ala. 603, 98 So. 871 (1924); Ex parte Bornee, 76 W. Va.
360, 85 S. E. 529 (1915); State v. Miller, 14 Ariz. 440, 130 P. 891 (1913). An
admirable discussion of what has and has not been considered to be double jeopardy
under statutes authorizing state appeals is presented in IO N. Y. UNiv. L. Q. REv.
373 (1933).
14
For example, it has been held that, when a jury has been properly sworn and
trial started, if the judge without necessity and without the consent of the accused
dismisses the jury before verdict, such action amounts to an acquittal and plea of
double jeopardy will be sustained. Ex parte Ulrich, (D. C. Mo. 1890) 42 F. 587;
Mitchell v. State, 42 Ohio St. 383 (1884). But the contrary was asserted by Story
in United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 579, 6 L. Ed. 165 (1824).
15 2 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 2d ed., u6o (1929); Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 121 Pa. 109, 15 A. 466 (1888); People v. Webb, 38 Cal.
467 (1869).
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sirable, and hence partially accounts for the expansion of the use of
state appeals.
2.

Several provisions of the Federal Constitution have been asserted as
standing in the way of appeals. by the state. The double jeopardy
clause of the Fifth Amendment has been held to prohibit appeals by
the government in federal courts.16 While it has been contended that
this clause should be a limitation on state action, it is now well settled
that the provisions of the first eight amendments are restrictions on
the national government only. 17
•
The assertion that the privileges and immunities clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 18 operates as a restriction on state appeals is
not as easily disposed of. A definite limitation was first put on this
clause in the Slaughter House Cases,19 where it was said that the
privileges and immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment referred to
such privileges of a United States citizen as "owe their existence to the
Federal Government, its national character, its Constitution or its
laws." This interpretation practically nullified the utility of the clause,
since Article :VI of the Constitution already protected from state
abridgment rights derived from these sources. 20 A strong dissent in this
and other cases maintained that the privileges and immunities guaranteed against state abridgment under the Fourteenth Amendment
were those "fundamental rights which belong to citizens of all free
governments." 21 This contention being denied, a further argument was
advanced that, while the first eight amendments, as limitations on
,power, apply only to the Federal Government and not to the states,
yet so far as they declare or recognize fundamental, common-law
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 24 S. Ct. 797 (1904).
Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. (32 U. S.) 242, 8 L. Ed. 672 (1833); Commonwealth v. Perrow, 124 Va. 805, 97 S. E. 820 (1919); Ex parte Ulrich, (D. C. Mo.
1890) 42 F. 587.
18 "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States" [§ 1, cl. 2].
19 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 36 (1873).
20 Article VI (2): "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made or which shall be made,
under authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of
any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
21 Field, J., in dissent to the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 36
(1873). Also Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 14 Wall. (81 U.S.) 129 (1873); Butcher's Union
v. Crescent City, III U.S. 746, 4 S. Ct. 652 (1884); Twining v. New Jersey, 2II
U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14 (1908). For a discussion of the development of the Court's
interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
see Warren, "The New Liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment," 39 HARV. L.
REv. 431 at 436 ff. (1926).
16
17
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rights of persons, these rights are theirs as citizens of the United States,
and that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect, at least,
these rights from state abridgment. 22 Justice Harlan in a dissenting
opinion 28 specifically designated the exemption from being put twice
in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offense as one immunity that
the Fourteenth Amendment must have included. The contention was
flatly disposed of in Maxwell v. Dow, 24 in which the Court stated that
the privileges and immunities under the Fourteenth Amendment are
those which attach to a person exclusively as a United States citizen
and specifically held that neither the Fourth, Fifth, nor Sixth Amendments granted rights which were of that character. These decisions
precluded an attack on state appeals under this clause of the Constitution. But in the recent case of Colgate v. Harvey, 25 the Court for
the first time declared a state statute unconstitutional under this
clause and protected a specific "natural" right. This would indicate that
the Court may be adopting a fundamental rights theory in interpreting
the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.26
If that is so, there would seem to be opened up a possible attack through
this clause on permitting state appeals. Oddly enough, such an attack
was attempted in a still more recent case 27 in the Supreme Court and
dismissed with a citation of Maxwell v. Dow, the Court making no
mention of Colgate v. Harvey.

3.
May the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment be
invoked as a weapon in an attack on allowing the state to appeal in a
criminal- prosecution? The problem is particularly important to the
22 This argument appears to have been first advanced in Spies v. Illinois, 123
U. S. 13 1 ( 188 7), but the Court, deeming it not necessary to the decision of the
case, declined to consider it. In GUTHRIE, LECTURES ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 61 (1898), the author, having examined the reports and papers of the framers
of this amendment, concludes, "it would seem to be entirely clear that the intention
was that the essential rights of life, liberty, and property distinctly recognized in the
Constitution and in the first eight amendments should, by the Fourteenth Amendment,
be made the indisputable and secure possession of every citizen of the United States
beyond the power of any state to abridge."
28 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 at 117, 29 S. Ct. 14 (1908).
2 ~ 176 U. S. 581, 20 S. Ct. 448 (1900).
25 296 U.S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252 (1935). The right protected was the right of a
citizen of the United States to transact business in other states without interference
by the state of his residence. See particularly the dissenting opinion of Justice Stone,
296 U. S. at 445, where he points out that the majority is departing from their
previous holding. It is difficult, however, to ascertain the precise purport of this decision.
26 See 24 CAL. L. REV. 728 (1936); DoDD, CASES oN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
2d ed., 871, note (1937), for discussion of this point.
27 Palko v. State, 302 U. S. 319 at 327, 58 S. Ct. 149 (1937).
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criminal defenders in those states which have no constitutional provision
regarding double jeopardy. 28 There are several standard methods of
approach used to ascertain whether a given right may be protected
against state action under the due process clause.
One of the tests most frequently resorted to in determining the
content of this clause is to ascertain whether the matter at hand is one
of "those settled usages and modes of proceedings existing in the common and statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors,
and shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this
country." 29 Undoubtedly the rule against double jeopardy was a
well recognized doctrine of ancient common law, was part of the
Magna Charta,so and was "acted on" by the state and federal governments, hence meeting the historical test. The rule that the state may
not appeal in a criminal prosecution, however, was formulated as a part
of the principle of double jeopardy for the first time by American
courts. This historical test is not to be resorted to as conclusive, and
if the procedure is necessary to provide protection to the state and
society its novelty will not vitiate it. 31
Another method used to ascertain the content of the due process
clause is to apply a comparative test. The argument is that the restraints
imposed by the due process of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
are identical; that the Fifth Amendment does not include any of the
guarantees specifically enumerated in the first eight amendments,
since the Constitution is not to be construed as redundant and repetitous; hence the Fourteenth Amendment does not contain these guarantees either. This argument was used by the Supreme Court in
Hurtado v. California in determining that the institution of grand
jury was not an essential element of due process in the Fourteenth
Amendment8 2 and its application would also exclude double jeopardy
from the protection of that clause. The Court, however, has not adhered to this limited use of due process which it had earlier stated;
it has come to view the character of the right, without regard to specific mention in the Constitution, as determinative of the content of
See note I 1, supra.
Twining v. New Jersey, 2II U. S. 78 at 100, 29 S. Ct. 14 (1908). Due
process is said to be the same as "law of the land" in Magna Charta. Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 at 545, 4 S. Ct. III (1884).
80 State v. Felch, 92 Vt. 477, 105 A. 23 (1918); Ex parte Ulrich, (D. C. Mo.
1890) 42 F. 587; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. (85 U.S.) 163, 21 L. Ed. 872 (1873).
81 3 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2d ed., 1707 (1929).
82 IIO U.S. 516 at 534, 4 S. Ct. III (1884).
28
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due process, and in recent years has held freedom of religion, 33 speech,84
press,ss and assembly 36 all of which are rights enumerated in the first
eight amendments to be within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment.87 It has been conjectured 38 that if the Supreme Court
continues its present expansion of the due process clause, every one of
the rights which are guaranteed by the Bill of Rights ( which, of course,
would include the principle of double jeopardy) will be protected from
deprivation by the state without due process.
Whether we consider the right of freedom from state appeals in
a criminal prosecution as part of substantive due process under "liberty,"
or as purely procedural due process, the final test in ascertaining
whether the right falls within the protection of the due process clause is
whether abolition of the right violates a principle of justice so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of the people as to be ranked as fundamental. 39 The test of fundamental rights is an approach more commensurate with the usual judicial thought processes than is any test
of mere application of mechanical rules of construction. Through this
test and by the process of judicial inclusion and exclusion of particular
rights, a body of fundamental rights may be built up which give a real
content to the due process clause. The approach is similar to that applied
in determining the use of the privilege and immunities clause by
Justice Field in his dissenting opinion to the Slaughter House Cases:'0
There is a distinction, however, between the protection given by the
privileges and immunities clause and that given by the due process
clause. In the former, if a fundamental right is said to come under it,
38

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1924); Hamilton
v. Regents of University, 293 U. S. 245, 55 S. Ct. 197 (1934).
34
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 at 259, 57 S. Ct. 732 (1937); De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299· U.S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255 (1937).
3
s Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 56 S. Ct. 444 (1936);
Gitlow v. United States, 268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625 (1925).
36
Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255 (1937).
37 A complete discussion of this subject may be found in Warren, "The New
Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment," 39 HARV. L. REv. 431 (1926). See
also 21 J. CRIM. L. 618 (1931); 32 CoL. L. REv. 1430 (1932); 31 MxcH. L. REv.
245 (1933); 35 M1cH. L. REv. 1373 (1937).
88
Warren, "The New Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment," 39 HARV.
L. REV. 431 at 460 ( I 926). For other expressions of the fundamental right test,
see 3 WILLOUGHBY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw, 2d ed., 1707 (1929); Taylor & Marshall
v. Beckman, 178 U.S. 548 at 602, 20 S. Ct. 890 (1900); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272
U.S. 312 at 316, 47 S. Ct. 103 (1926); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 at 68, 53
S. Ct. 55 (1932).
89
Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 47 S. Ct. 103, 48 A. L. R. 1102 at
I 106 (1926).
40
16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 36 at 95 ff. (1872).
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the state is ipso facto precluded from abridging it; in the latter, it may
still be abridged if to do so is not an unreasonable deprivation.41
Where the issue has been presented, the courts have not agreed
whether the right to be free from state appeals and double jeopardy is
one of the fundamental rights. In two early federal cases,42 the question whether freedom from double jeopardy was a fundamental right
to be protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment arose but not through the issue of state appeals. Both courts
emphatically stated that such right is one of those fundamental rights
safeguarded by this clause in the Constitution. In State v. Lee,48 an
early Connecticut case, the question whether immunity from state
appeals in a criminal prosecution as part of double jeopardy was such
a fundamental right as to be under the protection of the due process
clause was squarely presented to the court and, in a well reasoned
opinion, it was held that the "natural rights of the individual" and the
"essential principles of jurisprudence" are most accurately followed
when the controversy is finally settled in accordance with the law
after both sides have been given the opportunity to appeal for errors.
The same issue was before a Vermont court,44 which refused to enumerate or attempt to define just what fundamental rights are, but decided that "relief from the vexations of a second trial is not one."
Thirty-five years ago the question was raised before the Supreme
Court for the first time.45 The Court did not consider it since it was not
necessary to the decision. Recently the issue was squarely before the
Court in Palko v. State.4fj In that case the defendant was convicted of
41

The distinction is not so apparent in due process as applied to procedure as it
is as affecting property rights. In the former, the guarantee is said to be not so much
that a certain result has been obtained as that it has been reached in a fair way. See
Snyderv. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 54S. Ct. 330, 90A. L. R. 575 at 596 (1931).
42
Ex parte Ulrich, (D. C. Mo. 1890) 42 F. 587 (judge improperly adjourned
the case in the middle of the trial, thus acquitting the defendant, who raised the double
jeopardy plea on the new trial); In re Bennett, (D. C. Cal. 1897) 84 F. 324. In the
latter case the defendant was first tried on charge of assault with attempt to commit
murder, and found guilty of assault with deadly weapon. A plea of double jeopardy was
interposed when, after granting defendant a new trial, the trial again proceeded on the
charge of assault with attempt to commit murder. The court said, 84 F. at 326, "The
right of a person, after acquittal by a jury to be exempt from the jeopardy of being
again placed on trial in the same court, and upon the same indictment, for the identical
offense of which he has been acquitted, is certainly one of the fundamental rights which
has always been recognized by our system of jurisprudence as belonging to the citizen;
and, unquestionably, the guarantee of due process found in the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States was intended, among other things, to secure
to the citizen this right."
48
65 Conn. 265, 30 A. IIIO (1894). See 19 L. R. A. 342 (1893).
44
State v. Felch, 92 Vt. 477, 105 A. 23 (1918).
45
Dryer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71 at 85, 23 S. Ct. 28 (1905).
46
302 U.S. 319 at 328, 58 S. Ct. 149 (1937).

1938

J

COMMENTS

III

murder in the second degree. The state of Connecticut appealed in the
manner provided by a statute. 47 The appellate court reversed the
judgment, ordering a new trial. In the second trial the defendant was
convicted of murder in the first degree. There being no double jeopardy
provision in the state constitution on which to rely, defendant appealed
on the ground that the statute authorizing the state to appeal constituted a denial of due process. The Court used the test of fundamental
rights, after a careful examination of those things which have and have
not been held to be "fundamental," but made no mention of the early
lower federal court decisions which had held that double jeopardy
was a fundamental right; it decided that, at least, the kind of double
jeopardy to which the statute had subjected the defendant here was
not a "hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure
it," and was not a denial of due process.
It has been held that such things as freedom of speech, press, and
assembly, 48 the right to be represented by adequate counsel,4° the right
not to be convicted on confessions procured by torture, 50 and the right
to have a proceeding free from fraud, 51 partiality, 52 and mob domination 53 all are fundamental rights protected by the due process clause.
On the other hand, the rights to a grand jury indictment,54 to accompany the jury to the scene of the crime, 55 or even to have a trial by
jury 56 have been held not to be within the protection of this clause.
It would seem that the division is a proper one. That the former group
are either essential substantive rights, or rights which are absolutely
necessary to a fair and adequate judicial trial, seems self-evident. The
immunity from prosecution except as a result of indictment and the
right to trial by jury are certainly very important. But the process of
47
Conn. Gen. Stats. ( I 930), § 6494: "Appeals from the rulings and decisions
of the superior court or of any criminal court of common pleas, upon all questions of
law arising on the trial of criminal cases, may be taken by the state, with the permission
of the presiding judge, to the supreme court of errors, in the same manner and to the
same effect as if made by the accused."
48
Supra, notes 34, 35, and 36.
49
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932), discussed 31 MICH.
L. REV. 245 at 252 (1933).
50
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461 (1936), noted 12 IND.
L. J. 66 (1936).
111
3 WILLOUGHBY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw, 2d ed., 1713 (1929).
52
3 ibid., 1713; Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 41 S. Ct. 1230 (1920).
58
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461 (1936).
HHurtado v. California, IIO U.S. 516, 4 S. Ct. III (1884); Gaines v.
Washington, 277 U.S. 81, 48 S. Ct. 468 (1928).
55
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 54 S. Ct. 330 (1931).
56
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 20 S. Ct. 448 (1900); New York Cent.
R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 at 208, 37 S. Ct. 247 (1916); Frank v. Mangum,
237 U. S. 309 at 340, 35 S. Ct. 582 (1914).
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prosecution by information adequately supplants the former; and few
would any longer maintain that a fair and enlightened system of justice could not be carried on without the use of jury trial. Freedom from
state appeals in criminal cases is surely no more fundamental than
jury trial and the right of indictment.
A double jeopardy arising as the result of a new case being
brought on the same matter, after an acquittal on an original trial free
from error, would, it would seem, be shocking to our sense of justice
and, as those early federal cases held, be a deprivation of a fundamental
right. But an immunity from a state appeal because of some error in
the trial or in some preliminary ruling by the court does not seem to be
the very essence of a scheme of ordered justice. A close examination
will show that more good than harm would come from allowing the
state to appeal because of error in any stage of proceedings.
The restraint on the right of the state to have an equal opportunity
with the defendant to appeal has a demoralizing effect on all the
parties concerned. The defense attorney is permitted nearly absolute
freedom in what he may say or do. If he asks improper questions or
makes improper remarks, the state is not said to be prejudiced. The
prosecutor, on the other hand, must move cautiously else some slip
will be seized upon as error reviewable by an appellate court. The
judge is also placed in an uncomfortable position. No judge wants to
be reversed. He will be inclined to give all the instructions offered by
the defense and will, naturally, be very lenient in his rulings for the
defendant so as not to commit reversible error. But since he cannot be
reversed in his rulings as to the prosecution, he will probably make up
for his leniency to the other side.57
ls a right which brings about such an unbalanced and demoralized
system of justice as this "a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental?"
By refusing it would we violate those "fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions?" In short, is the right to be free from an appeal by the
state in a criminal prosecution a fundamental right to be protected from
abridgment by the states under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? It is submitted that the Supreme Court reached
the correct result in answering the question in the negative. Relaxation
of the strict rule against state appeals in criminal prosecutions is but a
part of an awakened administration of criminal law which has as its
57 These and other evils from the prevention of state appeals are fully discussed in
Miller, "Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases," 36 YALE L. J. 486 (1927); Brennan, "The Right of the State to Appellate Review in Criminal Cases," I OHIO ST.
UNIV. L. J. 93 (1935); Horack, "Prosecution Appeals in West Virginia," 41 W. VA.
L. Q. 50 (1934).
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end the apprehension and conviction of criminals rather than their
protection. Criminal defenders should not be permitted to interfere
with this effort by using the due process clause as a weapon against it.
Edward D. Ransom

